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Abstract 
The Belt and Road initiative, spearheaded by the People’s Republic of China, is one of 
the largest multilateral infrastructure and cooperation projects in the world, with the potential to 
alter the global economic and geopolitical climate. This paper investigates the effects of the 
initiative on the Republic of Tajikistan and the Italian Republic. The study uses dependency 
theory to contextualize the financial and political impacts of the initiative. Our analysis shows 
that the initiative is not extractive in itself. However, countries with more autocratic 
governments, in this case, Tajikistan, are likely to end up with deals that are not mutually 
beneficial and be part of extractive relationships. The study provides a framework using different 
geopolitical and economic aspects and indicators that suggest whether cooperation under the Belt 
and Road Initiative or otherwise is extractive or not. We conclude that participating countries in 
the BRI lie on a spectrum that goes from extractive to mutually beneficial, and the given factors 





In 2013, Chinese premier Xi Jinping proposed establishing the Belt and Road Initiative to 
promote connectivity and economic cooperation between China and the rest of the world. 
China's new trade program attracted many nations, especially members of the global south. To 
the developing world, Chinese investment translated to economic growth and stimulation. 
Although the BRI is open to all nations around the globe, projects in Asia, Europe, and Africa 
are primarily emphasized due to proximity. The paper, therefore, places more emphasis on the 
Eurasian region by providing case studies of Tajikistan and Italy. Due to their varying economic 
and political structures, both nations view the BRI differently. Besides the differing conceptions 
of the program, the different systems also contribute to how the BRI will impact the nation's 
short and long-term development. Although agreements have been signed between China and 
participating countries, projects are still in the process of being completed. Additionally, after the 
culmination of these projects, time must be set aside for their integration into the economy to 
adequately observe the net results. 
Due to the extensive nature of the BRI and its potential implications, it is necessary to 
examine the program from various angles and perspectives. For a comprehensive analysis of the 
situation and the dynamic between China and recipient countries, the paper explores several 
factors that contribute to uncovering the motivations behind the BRI and the main agents who 
pull the strings. In general terms, the paper will inquire whether the BRI has created a mutually 
beneficial relationship between Beijing and participating countries or if it is just a catalyst for 
China's endeavor to make partner countries dependent on the Asian superpower. Based on our 
findings, the initiative incorporates numerous geographic, political, and economic aspects that 
add an extra layer of intricacy. As a result, it is inaccurate to assume that China possesses all the 
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strings when it comes to the impact of the BRI. We concluded that the relationship between 
Beijing and participating countries is complex and depends on numerous elements that have 
often been overlooked.     
Our research also contributes to a theoretical discussion on economic development. This 
paper encompasses a scholarly examination surrounding dependency theory along with the 
Productive Capacities Index to analyze the effects of the BRI on Tajikistan and Italy. 
Dependency theory was a theoretical framework first developed in the late 1950s that defines 
dependence as a historical condition that shapes a particular structure in the world economy. It 
favors some countries to the detriment of others and limits the development possibilities of 
subordinate economics (Dos Santos, 1971). It has been historically defined as underdevelopment 
in countries in the global south due to the allocation of resources to activities beneficial to 
dominant states rather than areas needed by host countries. In particular, Chinese investments in 
developing countries such as Tajikistan could increase the subordinate countries' dependence on 
China, making their economic development more difficult. To further investigate these 
dependency relations, this paper encompasses the Production Capacities Index (PCI). The PCI is 
a theoretical framework developed by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) that provides an index to understand the status of the productive capacity of 
countries or regions. UNCTAD has long defined productive capacities as "the productive 
resources, entrepreneurial capabilities and production linkages, which together determine the 
capacity of a country to produce goods and services and enable it to grow and develop" 
(UNCTAD, 2006, p. 61). Productive capacity consists of three major factors: productive 
resources, entrepreneurial capabilities, and production linkages. Productive resources are the 
factors of production, including natural resources and different types of capital. Entrepreneurial 
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capabilities include the skills, knowledge, and information that enterprises possess for 
investment and production. Production linkages refer to the flow of goods and services, 
knowledge, technology, and information between firms or farms. The UNCTAD suggests that 
developing productive capacities plays an essential role in setting the long structural 
transformation processes in motion, which is the backbone of sustainable development. In order 
to build productive capacities, actions and interventions must be made at the domestic level that 
are coherent and economy-wide and must be complemented by robust international support. To 
understand productive capacities, the UNCTAD has developed an index that measures the 
current state of the productive capacity of economies. The index comprises eight components: 
information and communication technologies (ICTs), structural change, natural capital, human 
capital, energy, transport, the private sector, and institutions (UNCTAD, 2020, p. VII). The 
report suggests that if the initiative brought about sustainable development, it would focus on 
developing these eight components. However, the PCI was primarily developed with 
underdeveloped and developing countries in mind, so it is more applicable to Tajikistan's case 
than Italy's. Based on our findings, we argue that dependency theory is a valuable framework in 
the context of many cases of international cooperation; despite being conceived with the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries as the center and 
Latin American, African and Asian countries as peripheries. Our study suggests that other 
metropolitan/satellite relationships can develop with shifting global politics and that dependency 
relationships can be understood in the contexts of productive capacities and the countries' 
political inclinations. We argue that bilateral relationships tend to be extractive and closer to 
what dependency theory describes when it does not improve on the productive capacities for 
either nation and in cases where either or both of the countries’ politics are more autocratic.  
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Based on these frameworks and several other components, the paper is written in three 
parts. The first section provides a more in-depth overview of the BRI and its various components 
and skepticism surrounding the initiative. The following section discusses both the case studies, 
focusing on the economic and geopolitical aspects and analyzing the impacts of the initiative for 
both countries in the context of the dependency theory and sustainable development. Finally, the 
paper will provide a comparison between the two cases and assess the features of the BRI that 
would make it more or less likely to be mutually beneficial versus extractive in nature.  While also 
contributing a framework to analyze international agreements in economic and geopolitical terms 
and evaluate their impacts on dependency. 
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I. BRI Overview 
1. What is the Belt and Road Initiative? 
The historical Silk Road that connected the western sphere with the east has recently been 
replicated into a new commercial route known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with China 
at the forefront. According to a document issued by the National Development and Reform 
Commission, Ministry of Foreign, and Ministry of Commerce in China, “the Belt and Road 
Initiative is a systematic project, which should be jointly built through consultation to meet the 
interests of all, and efforts should be made to integrate the development strategies of the 
countries along the Belt and Road.” The “Belt” section of the title implies the sea-based route 
that the trade network will cover, while the “Road” entails the land-based route. Besides 
construction projects, China intends to establish free trade zones along the BRI’s commercial 
routes to enhance economic exchange between participating nations. The initiative aims to utilize 
between 1 to 8 trillion dollars (Hillman & Sacks, 2021) to fund various infrastructure projects to 
facilitate connectivity and trade. The commercial network was initially proposed in 2013, but 
projects headed by China commenced much earlier. These numerous projects revolve around the 
transport, energy, mining, communications, and IT sectors, estimated to be finished by 2049.   
Although the Chinese government operates the program,  87% of financing is derived 
from various state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as well as state-owned banks and funds such as the 
China Development Bank, Export-Import Bank of China, Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, 
New Development Bank, and the Silk Road Fund (HSBC n.d.). China has strategically placed 
these SOEs to directly manage these ventures to observe and supervise their foreign investments 
closely. Figure 1 highlights the different sources of finance for the BRI. 
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Figure 1: BRI funding by source type at the end of 2018 (US$ billion) 
Source: He, 2019 
The initiative is funded by five financial resources: pure aid, preferential loans, development 
finance, commercial loans, and various special funds. Pure aid is essentially in the form of grants 
that host countries are not required to pay back. The amount of pure aid is currently tiny, 
amounting to around $7 billion, with about half of it going to countries that are part of the 
economic corridors. Preferential loans are only available from the Export-Import Bank of China 
(CEXIM) and are usually given for around 20 years with a negotiation-dependent interest rate of 
2 percent. Development finance includes loans given directly towards infrastructure development 
and has an interest rate of around 3-4 percent with up to 20 years as well. Apart from these 
sources, China has set up more than 20 special funds, amounting to more than US$1500 billion 
to finance the BRI. The most notable one is The Silk Road Fund (SRF), established in 2014 that 
focuses on industrial and financial cooperation along with connectivity. Currently, the most 
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prominent financiers of the BRI are the China Development Bank (CDB) and the CEXIM, 
accounting for 40.0 and 31.5 percent of total outstanding loans (Liu et al., 2020). However, most 
large-scale projects are financed by multiple sources, sometimes a mixture of those mentioned 
above. 
The BRI involves approximately 140 countries (Green BRI Center, n.d.) in 6 different 
continents, where 64 were part of the historic silk route. However, the initiative also 
encompasses several other countries that have signed deals with China. Figures 2 and 3 show the 
participating countries as of January 2021 and the major routes being built over land and sea 
under the initiative.  
Figure 2: Countries that are part of the BRI as of January 2021 
 
Source: Green BRI Center, n.d. 
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Figure 3: Economic Corridors in the BRI 
 
Source: EURObiz Magazine, 2019 
The trade routes shown in Figure 3 consist of six economic corridors that connect 
countries in Eurasia and Africa to China. There are currently 93 documented projects under these 
corridors that seek to improve road, rail, and sea connectivity within Eurasia and parts of Africa. 
These improvements are further divided such that 67 are on the Silk Road Economic Belt and 26 
are on the Maritime Silk Road (Reed & Trubetskoy, 2019). Improved corridor management and 
connectivity is expected to bring down shipping times between 7 and 20 percent and trade costs 
between 5 and 17 percent (De Soyres et al., 2019).  Figure 4 shows the division of the corridors 
and how the BRI projects will connect countries in the Eurasian region by either improving 




Figure 4: Detailed rail and road structure of the economic corridors 
 
Source: Reed & Trubetskoy, 2019 
However, this does not encompass all the projects in the BRI. As seen in Figure 1, 
numerous other countries have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) under the 
initiative with China.  Countries in Europe, Africa, and South America that are part of the 
initiative have agreed to deals including but not limited to infrastructure loans, corporate 
partnerships, and reduction of trade barriers. The MoU’s are mostly bilateral deals between 
China and the countries shown in Figure 2. Additionally, the BRI has slowly grown to become 
an umbrella term encompassing almost all the international deals made by China. There is now a 
digital silk road, space silk road, and health silk road (Mardell, 2020), representing international 
cooperation in different sectors other than infrastructure. Hence, while the initiative started 
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primarily with infrastructure in mind, it has become a much larger venture that includes more 
sectors and projects. 
In his promotion of the BRI, Xi Jinping revealed that the initiative is intended to unfold 
in an environmentally friendly manner and utilize green technology that correlates with low-
carbon development.  He also mentioned that there would be constant maintenance of 
construction projects during this process to ensure that environmental standards are met. 
Although the nation's leader has delivered a very green approach, other information outlets 
provide contrasting responses. Various news sources have accused China of further distancing 
itself from combating climate change by "exporting coal-fired power plants and building carbon-
intensive infrastructure in other countries" (Hillman & Sacks, 2021). Regardless of the statement 
made by Xi, SOE's responsible for the individual projects will work in their best interest. Some 
will utilize green technology and environmentally friendly tools for their infrastructures, while 
others might disregard the environment entirely. In the case of the BRI, the "what" seems to 
offset the "how," as long as China's promise to establish the roads, ports, and other projects is 
met, the state-owned firms' approach is trivial to the central government.  
China is predicted to gain from this exchange in numerous ways. The expansion and 
improvement of trade will allow Chinese goods to travel farther and faster and provide more 
rural and less prosperous regions with an opportunity to develop. Moreover, China hopes 
participating nations will serve as new sources for its enormous manufacturing capacity and 
provide “secure cheap inputs for its manufacturing sector and set technical standards in foreign 
countries” (Hillman & Sacks, 2021). Besides the profits yielded by China, other countries are 
also capable of profiting immensely from the agreement. Intergovernmental organizations such 
as the United Nations and World Bank have endorsed China’s proposal. They believe that the 
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initiative has the potential to provide much-needed development to the global south. Lower trade 
costs and enhanced networks have the ability to reduce poverty and improve the standard of 
living in many of the BRI countries. However, many of these projects will generate revenue and 
only benefit their host nations if they work in unison with the other ventures. A report by the 
World Bank suggests that “interoperability is imperative for efficient and effective trade and 
transport flows. The railroads and waterways must be connected and utilized efficiently because 
adequate profits can only be attained in the aggregate. The economic corridors could improve 
trade routes with other countries, not just China, allowing host countries to have better access to 
foreign markets for exports as well as imports. The official statement from the Chinese 
government says that “the Belt and Road Initiative is a way for win--win cooperation that 
promotes common development and prosperity and a road towards peace and friendship by 
enhancing mutual understanding and trust, and strengthening all­round exchanges.”1  
2. Skepticism around the BRI 
However, there has been skepticism about the helpfulness of the BRI for the countries 
accepting the loans, especially with "China's international loans surpassing more than 5 percent 
of the global GDP". Long-term sustainability goals are in question, especially as many 
participating nations struggle with debt issues and have been forced to cancel some projects or 
scale down the size of previously proposed plans. Experts have claimed China has intentionally 
ambushed these nations in a state of financial obligation by employing "debt-trap diplomacy". 
China has been accused of providing BRI nations with a surplus of loans hoping that this sum 
will be difficult or impossible to repay, leaving nations with large quantities of external debt.  
 
1 Issued by the National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign, and Ministry of 
Commerce in China 
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Unlike domestic debt, foreign debt is much more complicated and carries extensive ramifications 
on the economy of the borrowing country. For instance, foreign debt is often denominated in the 
lender's currency; therefore, if the borrower's currency weakens, it will be much harder to fulfill 
those debts. Once a country is highly indebted to a foreign source, it will have less money to 
invest in domestic economic development and are often forced to borrow again or surrender 
certain economic and political privileges, facilitating a never-ending cycle of dependency. By 
ensnaring them in this economic trap, critics argue, China gains economic and political leverage 
over the indebted countries. This has been illustrated and amplified with the case of the 
Hambantota port in Sri Lanka financed by Chinese firms, who then took control of the port for 
99 years because the Sri Lankan government failed to pay off the loans (Braddick, 2021). China's 
deal with Sri Lanka depicts an agreement that expands beyond economic development and 
potentially demonstrates China's geopolitical ambitions. Besides financial commitments, many 
nations have had to alter the deals they made with China due to new regimes and the detrimental 
economic effects of COVID-19.  These elements have incited fear in many of the participating 
nations, who were beginning to question the initiative's sustainability. To combat the rampant 
fear, China built the China–IMF Capacity Development Center that collaborates with BRI 
countries to educate officials about the economic attributes of the proposal (Gerstel, n.d.). 
Besides the possibility of falling to Chinese debt tactics, many of the SOE's under the 
supervision of these projects primarily hire Chinese workers while disregarding the local labor 
force, affecting employment numbers, and concealing any additional benefits that local 
populations could have obtained through the agreement. 
Another primary concern regarding the BRI is economic dependency for the host 
countries on Chinese loans or trade. While China claims to interfere minimally with other 
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countries' political and economic systems, strategic investments and trade deals could potentially 
lead some developing countries in the BRI to experiencing extractive relationships with and 
become economically dependent on China. 
Although China has been accused of improper financing tactics, the developing world 
does not have many other options. China has been regarded as one of the better funding sources, 
as Western private loans are deemed too costly, they are usually provided for a shorter period, 
and negotiating details is often very time-consuming. Additionally, western funding often comes 
with a democratic agenda, and institutions prefer to finance more social service-oriented projects 
rather than infrastructure ventures. In the past, organizations like the World Bank allocated 
nearly 70% of funds towards economic infrastructure, but recently that number has dropped to 
only 30% (Dollar 2020). As a result, China happens to be the best option for countries to access 
expedited funding for infrastructure plans. The West has noticed the global shift in funding and 
has repeatedly stated its disapproval of China's financial motives in the world, especially with the 
launch of the BRI. To combat Chinese expansion in the commercial sphere, the US, Australia, 
and Japan established the Blue Dot Network (BDN) as an alternative to the BRI. This network 
was created "to guarantee that the infrastructure of the future is built in a safe, transparent, and 
accountable manner" (Basu, 2020). By providing the developing world with an alternative, the 
founders of the BDN are working to divert attention away from China as well as expose key 
features in Chinese funding by constantly characterizing the BDN as "transparent", "financially 
sustainable", and "environmentally friendly". Although the global north has supplied the 
international community with another funding source, the BDN does not have enough credibility 
due to its novelty. Additionally, deals with China have already been signed, and projects are 
underway. Developing countries continue to seek financial assistance from different institutions 
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to boost economic growth. The BDN, World Bank, and BRI are just different alternatives, each 
coming with a set of pros and cons.  
3. Geopolitics of the BRI 
Apart from the financial skepticism, many critics fear China has other ambitions as well. 
The introduction of the BRI aligns with China's one-hundred-year plan that seeks to transform 
the nation into an economic and technological authority. With the expansion of various trading 
routes and the restructuring of numerous roads and ports, Xi hopes to divert global commerce 
away from the global north and towards China. With projects in many parts of the world, China 
will have access to various types of commercial intelligence that it could utilize to its advantage 
in the future. Those who disapprove of BRI believe this could come in the form of military 
power or pressure towards borrowing nations in the political and economic sphere (Hillman & 
Sacks, 2021). Through heavy investment, China is not only allowing these nations to soak the 
benefits of global trade but creating a culture of dependency and fear among its BRI partners. 
While the Chinese government has long advocated for non-interference in other countries' 
policies and sovereignty, there is empirical and case-study-based evidence that bilateral deals 
with China are embedded with conditionalities that are less economic and more geopolitical. It is 
argued that "China's conditionality when it comes to aid is almost entirely political; requiring 
recipient countries to support China's positions on various global issues." For example, China is 
known to have asked its trading partners to support the diplomatic isolation of Taiwan (Mattlin 
and Nojonen, 2011). As a result, nations indebted to China will think twice before questioning 
Beijing's stance on human rights and domestic policies.  
Generally, there is an ongoing debate about whether the Belt and Road Initiative will be 
helpful for the host countries in an economic and geopolitical sense. In order to respond to this 
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question, this paper focuses on two countries that are part of the BRI, Tajikistan and Italy, that 
have contrasting characteristics in the financial and political spheres. Specifically, this paper 
investigates whether the BRI is extractive for the participating nations in the context of the 
dependency theory. Additionally, the paper aims to understand and illustrate factors that make 
diplomatic relations mutually beneficial or exploitative. These countries can serve as models for 
the general effect of the Belt and Road Initiative on other participating nations that have similar 




II. Tajikistan Case Study 
1. Introduction 
Tajikistan ranks among some of the world's poorest countries with plenty of natural 
resources but not enough technological capacity or governmental integrity to strengthen the 
nation's economic state. Poverty is rampant and foreign investment is low. The supply of 
infrastructure projects proposed by the BRI can potentially fill the needs of Tajikistan's 
economy. China has bestowed Tajikistan with a formal proposal under a transcontinental 
agreement that would allow China to invest in diverse sectors of Tajik society while directly 
linking their commercial routes. The BRI seems like a great opportunity on the exterior, but 
many experts believe China's goal is to solidify its grasp on the developing world through heavy 
funding. China has been incriminated as an extractive source that desires to make nations like 
Tajikistan economically dependent on Beijing once it fails to repay its loans. To further examine 
the possible outcomes of the BRI, it is imperative to dive deeper into the historical negotiations 
between the two countries and analyze their economic development. Tajikistan serves as an ideal 
model of study, as negotiations between the two have been going on for decades, and Tajikistan's 
proximity happens to be very useful for China's geostrategic agenda. By analyzing the BRI in the 




 Figure 5: External Debt as a percentage of GDP - Tajikistan 
Source: Arcgis database (from World Bank) 
Figure 6: Foreign Exchange rate 




2. History with China 
Although the collapse of the Soviet Union established an independent Tajikistan, stability 
was only achieved after a bloody civil war. The vacuum of power left by the communist regime 
took several years to be filled. As an underdeveloped and novel nation, Tajikistan did not have 
many other alternatives. Many of Central Asia's leaders had little to no knowledge on how 
markets functioned or how to organize a post-Soviet economy that aligned with the global 
market. The transition from a command economy to a market economy presented many 
challenges to the new regimes, as much of the governing and economic activity was managed 
from Moscow. Simultaneously, their historical dependence on Russian goods and materials made 
it difficult for Tajikistan to form a self-reliant commercial sector. Much of Tajikistan's economy 
was based on agriculture, primarily cotton, which it wanted to mechanize to improve efficiency 
and output. Tajikistan has also wanted to branch out and industrialize numerous other parts of the 
country and create more developed cities to provide for the growing population and the new 
labor force left in a state of confusion and fear after the departure of the Soviet Union. The newly 
instituted government hoped to attract foreign investment through industrialization and 
privatization to continue this form of economic evolution that would replace Tajikistan's position 
as a poor communist nation (Library of Congress, 2007, p.6). Many Western countries and 
international organizations avoided providing any assistance due to Tajikistan's ties to Russia. 
Additionally, many Islamic nations recognized Tajikistan's communist past and associated it 
with an anti-Islamic sentiment, therefore abstaining from establishing government relations 
(Abdullo, 2015). As a result, Russia was a natural economic and political ally, fulfilling the 
critical role of an international partner. Although under a new name and government system, the 
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Russian state did not want to permanently lose its previous grip over the former states, so it 
continued to indirectly serve as an economic guide and contributor. 
Besides Moscow, Tajikistan needed other allies and other sources of foreign aid and 
investment to solidify its new yet unstable autonomous foundation. At the time, China appeared 
as a geographically and economically ideal candidate to fulfill Tajikistan's needs, so the 
government stretched out a diplomatic hand to Beijing. Initially, China recognized Tajikistan as 
a worthy ally, but economic negotiations did not occur until the late 1990s, when China began to 
experience rapid economic expansion (Karrar & Mostowlansky, 2020). To service this new 
economic capacity, China searched for new markets and new sources for raw materials. 
Tajikistan and other Central Asian nations possessed a very appealing feature as many of them 
were newly established and required much-needed capital for development. As a growing 
economic source, China possessed the necessary funding while these nations had the necessary 
resources. At the initial stages, Tajikistan's relationship with Beijing fulfilled mutual economic 
needs, but it was also another opportunity for China to reconstruct the long-lost Silk Road. For 
most of the 20th century, China fell behind in regional authority to the USSR. However, the 
separation of powers within Eurasia has paved a new path to fulfill former geopolitical interests 
(Walsh, 1993, pp.272-275). After several discussions, Tajikistan and China were able to generate 
a more formal commercial relationship. Previously closed roads and routes during the 
communist era were reopened, such as the Kulma highway, to facilitate and demonstrate their 
openness towards trade (Karrar & Mostowlansky, 2020). China distributed approximately $357 
million to reconstruct this highway which connected the center of Tajikistan to China (EurAsian 
Times Desk, 2019). This initiative catalyzed future negotiations and commercial agreements 
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between the two. Based on the corresponding wants and needs, Tajikistan and China were able to 
construct stronger economic ties, which would eventually lead to the proposal of the BRI. 
In addition to another economic resource, China's position in Tajikistan's international 
vision originates from wanting to lessen its reliance on Moscow. By diversifying its connections, 
Tajikistan strives to create a more globalized name for itself that is not dependent on just one 
source for economic exchanges. As of now, a sizable portion of Tajikistan's GDP originates from 
remittances sent back by labor migrants in Russia. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
Tajik men have journeyed to Russia in search of decent pay to provide for their families back 
home. In 2019 alone, $2.5 billion worth of remittances were sent back, making up nearly 28% of 
the country's GDP (World Bank, 2019).  Although this generates substantial revenue, Tajikistan 
hopes for an improved domestic economy based less on the Russian economy. The Russian 
government has also noticed the large influx of migrant workers and has imposed new 
regulations to make it harder for these laborers to find work. These requirements ranged from 
new examination tests to new biometric passports, which set an additional obstacle for many 
labor migrants (Sheraliev, 2021). The new policies resulted in annual reductions in the money 
sent back from $3.4 billion in 2014 to $2.5 billion in 2019; in GDP figures, this was a drop from 
37% to 28% (World Bank, 2019).  By distancing itself from Russia's economy, Tajikistan hopes 
to become less vulnerable to the ramifications that may develop from new Russian regulations 
and other adverse economic effects. Since western sanctions were imposed on Russia, Moscow 
has suffered numerous economic repercussions, impeding its ability to fulfill its promises to 
invest in Tajikistan and other Central Asian countries. The recent COVID pandemic was another 
global development that effectively illustrated Tajikistan's reliance on Russia's labor market, as 
remittances drastically dropped and the single source of income for many was lost (World Bank, 
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2019). By searching for new means of capital, Tajikistan aspires to create an economy that is not 
dependent on its historical partners but collaborates with numerous other countries.  
 
3. BRI Projects 
Alienated from most of the commercial world due to the lack of resources, foreign 
investment often avoids Tajikistan. Based on the meager set of options for economic 
advancement, China's bid looks very promising. Like many other developing nations, Tajikistan 
wants to diversify its source of revenue. The Central Asian country possesses "over 137 deposits 
of industrial gold and 127 nonindustrial gold deposits", which it wants to develop further to 
stimulate the economy. A Tajik Chinese Joint Mining Company, "Zarafshon" generates nearly 
754 million Somoni in taxes and employs nearly 3,000 workers (Shamiev, 2020, p. 83). With 
China serving as one of Tajikistan's primary buyers, this could be a mutually beneficial exchange 
due to the many mines that Tajikistan has to offer, as long as the push and push factors are 
clearly examined from Tajikistan's point of view. Due to the lack of other sources of financing, 
Tajikistan has found Chinese capital as an attractive gateway. Based on the large capacity of 
minerals, Tajikistan looks to develop its mining industry further. However, it must follow the 
correct procedure when signing agreements with China to avoid making the mining sector 
dependent on Beijing. 
To make the proposal even more tempting, China has implemented a policy of double 
preferential loans to numerous BRI countries. This procedure tends to be more attractive to 
financial recipients because it comes "with low-interest rates and a lengthy repayment duration" 
(Yan, 2020, p.53). Other organizations and nations are less lenient regarding credit and often 
pressure the recipients to pay back promptly with high-interest rates. China's economic 
expansion gives them an advantage as the country does not need an immediate return on its 
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investment, as it has other sources of revenue. Beijing's loan policy creates a mutually beneficial 
agreement with Tajikistan, as it has a much harder time repaying its debt, and China can still 
loan out money as it is not constrained by time. 
 China and Tajikistan have signed several infrastructure projects in the energy, 
transportation, and agriculture sectors. Although China has been investing diversely in 
Tajikistan, capital to improve and construct road and railroads are especially prevalent. Due to 
Tajikistan's mountainous terrain and dangerous land conditions, many regions in the nation lack 
proper transport infrastructure or have decayed roads from previous inadequate construction. 
Many of these road and rail projects began before the formal proposal made by China's leader, 
but they are being categorized as part of the BRI (Aminjonov et al., 2019, p.2). For instance, the 
reconstruction of the Dushanbe - Chanak highway was initiated in 2006 and was completed in 
2013. There are numerous other examples of Chinese-led initiatives signed between the two that 
were implemented prior to the establishment of BRI that have set a precedent for future 
construction projects in Tajikistan. 
 One of the most notable road projects has been the Vahdat-Yovon railway which was 
finished in 2016. The construction cost surpassed $72 million, but it was seen as a valuable 
investment as the railway connected central Tajikistan to various provinces in Khatlon, 
improving transportation and flow of trade (Mahalingam, 2020). Many of the road and transport 
infrastructure takes place in Western Tajikistan to regions and provinces closer to China meant to 
directly link Tajikistan to the Asian superpower. Besides uniting China with Tajikistan, the 
proximity of projects allows for further management and operating power from the SOE's.  
 Rehabilitation and expansion of the road system in Tajikistan is a necessity, as much of 
the current infrastructure is inadequate. Mountains cover approximately 92% of Tajikistan; 
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therefore, roads are challenging to construct and manage. Road renovation is essential not only 
for economical transportation but also for the general movement of people from different parts of 
the country. Many of the roads in major cities are worn out and are practically impossible to 
travel on during the winter due to the mountainous terrain, weather, and poor previous 
construction methods. Besides general traveling, inadequate transport conditions have inhibited 
the exploration and production of minerals within Tajikistan (Karrar & Mostowlansky, 2020). 
Additionally, much of the roads and other types of infrastructure were destroyed due to the civil 
war, which could be another explanation for Tajikistan's motivation to accept Chinese-led 
infrastructure projects.  
Although many of the projects executed in Tajikistan lean more towards road 
infrastructure, China has also allocated money to improving the nation's inadequate energy 
system. Nearly 50% of BRI's energy investments are meant for electricity generation projects, 
while 7% is meant for electric power transmission and distribution (OECD, 2019). Projects like 
the construction of the Dushanbe power plant and the rehabilitation of the Nurek Dam are 
representations of initiatives that were recently completed and were able to fulfill much of the 
country's energy needs (Aminjonov et al., 2019). China's focus on the energy sector correlates 
with Tajikistan's demands and is meant to improve the quality of life.  
Another infrastructure program that China has been heavily involved in is constructing 
industrial parks, which "function primarily as an information platform for Chinese companies to 
kick-start their businesses". Employees at these centers provide Chinese firms with expertise and 
suggestions to ease legal matters. Additionally, these industrial parks experience many perks as 
they can avoid various foreign sanctions and benefit from lower operating costs. As of now, 
there are two locations that are meant to host these facilities. Plans mention a $500 million 
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nonferrous metal industrial park located in Istiklol and another agricultural textile park valued at 
$283 million located in Khatlon (Yan, 2020, p.56-57). These parks are another representation of 
Beijing's diverse investment patterns. 
China's strong interest in the Central Asian region, particularly Tajikistan, stems from 
numerous reasons. One eye-catching factor is that the nation is home to numerous types of rare 
earth metals that China utilizes to "produce high-technology items such as solar panels or 
rechargeable batteries" (Sim & Aminjonov, 2020, p. 22). This depicts why China is so keen to 
invest in Tajikistan as it can supply China with the raw materials to produce higher value-added 
goods. Tajikistan happens to be a "gold mine" for China as the developing nation carries the 
needed resources China desperately needs and wants. The proximity makes agreements easier to 
fulfill and allows China to execute more projects around the mining sector and the improvement 
of transport routes to make it easier for these goods to exit the country efficiently.  
Tajikistan's location serves a very imperative role for the success of the BRI and other 
geopolitical ventures headed by China. Tajikistan happens to be at the intersection of three 
economic corridors; therefore, its geographic position is vital for Beijing (Reynolds, 2018). 
Besides the main economic passageways heavily advertised by the BRI, Tajikistan happens to be 
one of the countries meant to host the gas pipeline discussed between Turkmenistan and China. 
Chinese foreign direct investment has reached nearly $3 billion to finance Line D of the Central 
Asia-China gas pipeline, depicting their strong interest in fully executing this project (Hurley et 
al., 2018, p. 18). If the gas pipeline project succeeds with Turkmenistan, Tajikistan will serve as 
a crucial hallway that allows the natural resource to run through its land to China. In the past 
couple of decades, China has depicted its tremendous growth and has developed into a large 
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consumer of energy. The pipeline will feed their growing economy and serve as an easy source 
of energy that China wants and needs.  
 Another reason Tajikistan possesses an ideal location for China's BRI endeavor is that it 
serves as a border for China in combating potential extremism and other military threats poised 
at the Chinese state. Due to Tajikistan's membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 
Tajikistan has a geographic role in supporting China's fight against the "three evils of terrorism, 
separatism, and religious extremism." (Rehorst & Kuijl, 2021). Tajikistan's geopolitical location 
near Afghanistan's Wakhan corridor has allowed China to set up a military base in the Gorno-
Badakhshan Autonomous Province to monitor any extremism coming from the Southern part of 
Central Asia. Besides Afghanistan, Tajikistan's proximity to the Xinjiang province has made it 
another helpful resource. Beijing wants to have security on both sides of Xinjiang to protect its 
growing economic interests (Rehorst & Kuijl, 2021). As a result, China has been ruthless in its 
counter-terrorism strategy by oppressing the Uighur people to incite fear and avoid extremist 
behavior. In addition to military methods, China has been pumping money into the Gorno-
Badakhshan Autonomous Province to improve the local economy to improve the quality of life 
and discourage the population from turning to extremism (EurAsian Times Desk, 2019). 
Tajikistan is the connector of many of China's trading hubs and projects; therefore, the region 
needs to be militarily stable to prevent any attacks that might damage the reputation of the BRI. 
Due to its extensive geopolitical capacity, Tajikistan's location presents them with the 
opportunity to arrange some parts of the agreement that benefits them more than others or 
negotiate the financial attributes of the BRI that make it more sustainable. With proper 
negotiations, China can execute its geopolitical agenda, reduce its dependence on sea routes, and 
have an alternative path towards Africa and Europe (Sim & Aminjonov, 2020, p.21). While 
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China utilizes Tajikistan's ideal proximity, Tajikistan can use this advantage to fulfill national 
development goals and negotiate more feasible deals for a nation of the global south. 
4. Comprehensive Assessment of BRI  
a. China’s Debt Trap 
China recently surpassed Russia as Tajikistan's largest source of foreign investment 
(Reynolds, 2018). Although this suggests a healthy development for Tajikistan, reality says 
otherwise. Around 45% of Tajikistan's imports are from China, but China also holds 53% of 
Tajikistan's debt, in exact figures approximately $1.2 billion of the $2.9 billion of foreign debt is 
owed to China (Karrar & Mostowlansky 2020). The Export-Import Bank of China sits at the top 
of this debt pyramid, being the largest source with loans surpassing $1.2 billion (Aminjonov & 
Kholmatov, p.99, 2019). This form of dependency began to grow after the civil war and has 
trickled into contemporary times. Prior to 2007, Russia, Uzbekistan, and the World Bank were 
the nation's primary creditors. However, once loans from the Export-Import Bank of China 
began to pour in, they surpassed every other nation and organization. Unlike the World Bank, the 
Chinese bank seems more appealing as it does not have reforms associated with its loans. Often, 
the World Bank demands higher energy prices so loans could be paid back in a timely manner by 
the government, but this could create more obstacles for civilians who cannot afford the 
requested increase. On the other hand, Chinese loans do not advocate for any specific reforms 
but instead call for the use of their own labor force in the execution of projects (CABAR, 2021). 
Due to the lack of any immediate effects, Chinese creditors are seen as a better alternative.  
Although China seems like the better option, compared to other funding sources, 
Tajikistan is at a high risk of "debt distress"; therefore, funding from China must be examined 
closely. Debt has increased from 28% of GDP in 2014 to 50% by 2017, driven by higher fiscal 
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deficits and a significant depreciation of the somoni (World Bank, 2020). The falling exchange 
rate has generated several issues for the national economy as it has made imports more expensive 
and has raised the value of the amount owed to creditors. Based on macroeconomic factors and 
dependency on China, Tajikistan's long-term plans are difficult to digest. Tajikistan is not 
necessarily forced to continue its financial relationship with China; however, the Central Asian 
nation is so far in the extraction process that the most optimal way to develop would be to 
continue moving forward but with caution.  
Additionally, many critics argue that China is intentionally shaping these negotiations 
and projects to their own liking and attempting to "lock-in" these countries while ensuring that 
other options are "locked out." In the past decade, China has been a dominant actor in the 
economic sphere and served as a reliable source of financing. Although the developing world 
sees China as an attractive economic partner, they fail to recognize Beijing's attempt at 
"conditioning its beneficiaries who desperately need funding for infrastructure projects" 
(Abdoubaetova & Wolters, 2020, p.7). China has efficiently gathered enough intel on the 
developing world to know where to invest and how to implement strategic financing that places 
China at an advantage. Many argue that when negotiating with other countries, China is the main 
decider when choosing types of projects to execute, implying that Beijing is only spending 
money on projects that will result in its best interest (Aminjonov & Kholmatov, 2019, p.98). 
Tajikistan is blindly accepting Chinese investment, assuming newer infrastructure automatically 
translates to development, overlooking the long-term effects of the financing. Due to this flawed 
way of thinking, Tajikistan has fallen into China's "debt trap", and now it must find a way to 
maneuver its way out of this snare. Due to the complexity of the issue, Tajikistan does not have 
very many doors to go through. In fact, with the growth of Chinese-led projects and debt, 
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Tajikistan has altered its National Development Strategy for 2030 to align with the BRI (OECD, 
2019). Tajikistan's financial ties to Beijing are so extensive that they are starting to develop 
direct links; as a result, the government has modified its long-term economic goals to 
complement China's economic growth. 
The temporary employment that Tajik workers could have obtained from the BRI 
projects has also been withheld by the Chinese firms.  The SOEs responsible for construction 
primarily hire Chinese workers because Tajikistan lacks any laws requiring foreign firms to hire 
domestic workers. As of 2014, there have been more than 82,000 Chinese workers in the 
country, and most of them get paid much higher than Tajik workers (Reynolds, 2018). Tajik 
sociologist Rustam Haidarov believes this is a small part of "China's strategy to resettle its 
people in different countries" (Pannier, 2011). Due to the lack of collateral, Tajik officials are 
lenient when exercising policies against China due to the enormous debt owed. Working and 
living conditions are already meager; with the addition of China's labor migrants, Tajikistan's 
civilians face more job shortages and are forced to find work abroad. Even though Tajikistan 
wants to minimize its remittance dependency, it indirectly continues to rely on the foreign labor 
market rather than improve the conditions of the domestic market. 
China retains an infamous status when it comes to combating climate change. In the past 
decade, the government has been attempting to decrease emissions within the country. Although 
it is trying to improve the country's environment, it is solely focusing on domestic progress. 
Beijing has been known to implement "a policy of transferring industries that adversely affect 
the environment from its territory to neighboring countries" (Aminjonov & Kholmatov, 2019, 
p.102). By externalizing environmental harm, China expects to get rid of the mounting pressure 
that has come with its excessive emissions. Beijing has become the world's largest exporter of 
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coal power equipment and continues to do so to outsource coal production for Chinese benefits 
while leaving importers to deal with the environmental result (Sherwin, 2016). For instance, 
China has facilitated the construction of several cement and coal plants that have shifted 
Tajikistan's position from an importer of cement to a net exporter. The increase in coal 
production has also persuaded industries to change their fuel intake from hydropower to coal. 
Although this seems like advancement from an economic point of view, this is only a short-term 
phenomenon as long-term environmental issues will offset any temporary benefits. The 
environmental bill that will come with this new switch is meant to equal more than $40 million a 
year (Aminjonov & Kholmatov, 2019, p.102). Tajikistan's desire to develop has blinded them 
from considering the environment; therefore, the nation is not thoroughly examining China's coal 
projects. The Central Asian state's central focus on rapid economic growth has forced it to 
overlook long-term economic effects that will be vastly impacted by environmental harm 
transported from China. 
 China's role in Tajikistan possibly expands beyond infrastructure projects. Many 
residents believe that China's grand strategy revolves around the surveillance and manipulation 
of Tajik society. They are worried that China is targeting sectors like the "telecom market so as 
to make it fully dependent on Chinese products and services". This concern comes as a result of 
the entire telecommunications system in Tajikistan utilizing equipment produced by ZTE and 
Huawei (Aminjonov & Kholmatov, p.101, 2019). Although this provides the developing nation 
with technology that can help with security and communication, the resources provided by the 
Chinese state may have ulterior motives. China's digital expansion in Central Asia is not a novel 
development but a process that has been transpiring for the last several years. Huawei and ZTE 
have provided Central Asian countries with an opportunity to develop "Safe Cities", by 
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supplying them with technology to monitor their people. Although Tajikistan and other Central 
Asian countries are keen to accept Chinese electronics, they fail to see China's motives to gain "a 
monopoly over the global data supply chain" (Jardine, 2019). 
Political alliances may also be disturbed as a consequence of working with China. 
Through collaboration with Chinese ventures and furthering itself from Russia, Tajikistan might 
face an opportunity cost of joining the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and possibly fall short 
of any advantages this organization offers. The EAEU, in many ways, is meant to mirror Russia's 
previous grasp on Soviet states. It is Moscow's approach to gaining back the economic and 
political allegiance that was lost after the collapse of communism in the USSR. The EAEU 
strives to outline a geographic area comprising former Soviet states and promote free trade 
around this region (Indeo, 2020, pp.8-14). The only issue is that some nations like Tajikistan 
have not joined the partnership and have been very hesitant with their responses. Tajikistan's 
reluctance has generated various obstacles for the nation as civilians from non-EAEU countries 
were forced to undergo more procedures when traveling to Russia in search of work. Russia's 
labor migration policies went into action in 2016, but Tajikistan has still not budged even though 
the new rules have drastically decreased remittances, negatively translating into the domestic 
economy (Madiyev, 2021). Based on this approach, Tajikistan hopes that the long-term 
agreements with China will outway the short-term loss from Russia. 
 The EAEU was initially established to improve economic integration and hinder China's 
expansion into Central Asia. Since then, it has evolved to cater to the new global economic 
arrangement that displays China's commercial economic strength. Russia and China have agreed 
to synchronize the BRI and EAEU to generate mutual benefits for both parties but have not 
formalized this agreement as participating nations (Indeo, 2020, pp.8-14). Even with these new 
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developments, Tajikistan has been very reluctant to join Russia's economic association. Although 
not officially stated, Tajikistan could be vulnerable to financial pressure from Beijing due to its 
evident position as Tajikistan's leading source of investment. China might be playing both sides 
of the political game by playing "friendly" with Russia, agreeing to cooperate and split 
Tajikistan's economic contribution while controlling Tajikistan's strings behind the scene. China 
wants to appear as an accepting ally and partner to Russia while gaining benefits from both sides. 
Due to its tremendous position in the economic sphere, China can influence various deals and 
push certain nations to satisfy their interests. Beijing's economic and political authority is 
undeniable, which makes negotiations tricky. Unless Tajik officials thoroughly examine the 
commercial deals presented to them, they might be left with the short side of the stick in both 
scenarios.  
b. Blame Goes Two Ways 
 Although China has been accused of lending money with the hopes of entrapping nations 
in a fiscal dilemma, some observers claim that states such as Tajikistan were already facing 
excessive debt. They argue that China entered and presented these nations with infrastructure 
projects at a serendipitous moment, but Beijing is not the architect of their economic downfall. 
Blame should be divided among the "creditors and recipients" rather than placing China as the 
scapegoat behind Tajikistan and several other nations' inadequacy of capital (Rehorst & Kuijl, 
2021). As of now, much of the narrative has been presented by Western media that traditionally 
has had a very anti-Chinese outlook, so their content has villainized Chinese investment abroad 
(Carminati, 2019). These outlets solely focus on the aspects of agreements that illustrate China as 
an economic criminal that sets up the developing world for failure through heavy funding rather 
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than a commercial partner. The media has been a leading instrument in how people perceive the 
BRI, shaping the world's image of China and its economic endeavors.  
 In many ways, officials who govern the country have contributed to Tajikistan's debt 
status. Government leaders are in complete agreement with the goals of the BRI as they see the 
projects as an ideal opportunity to advance their own self-interest. The initiative reinforces the 
power held by the Tajik elite and facilitates patrimony and kleptocracy within the country. 
Chinese investment in infrastructure strengthens the position of the officials and helps them 
extract wealth from the governed. Corruption is prevalent, especially within the president's 
family, who possess many powerful positions within the state (Karrar & Mostowlansky, 2020). 
Those who govern the country set aside a large portion of the funds that come from the Chinese 
for their own spending. As a result, the capital presented by China ends up staying at the top of 
the political hierarchy instead of being distributed to the people of the nation.  
 To further lower their capacity in the agreement, Tajikistan has not been paying back 
loans in standard fashion but rather signing away land and mining rights to China. In 2011, 
Tajikistan gave away 1100 square km of land near the Afghan border and gave away 2,000 
hectares of land to till for Chinese farmers, which occurred in exchange for millions of dollars in 
debt relief (Reynolds, 2018).  Unlike other Central Asian countries, Tajikistan does not have 
much suitable land for cultivation, yet nearly 72% of the population derives its income from 
agriculture (Aminjonov & Kholmatov, 2019, p.98). By giving away land as if it was not a scarce 
resource, the government jeopardizes their own civilians' welfare and source of livelihood. 
Another case of giving away Tajik property can be examined when Chinese firm Tebian Electric 
Apparatus built two thermal power plants in the capital. As payment, the president granted them 
control over the Eastern Duboa and Upper Kumarg gold-bearing mines until they make enough 
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profit to offset the $332 million investment. Long-term rent of land by Chinese companies has 
caused massive resentment among the public, but civilians do not have very many other options 
to turn to (Qoraboyev & Moldashev, 2017, p.115 -130). Tajikistan has overlooked the long-term 
consequences, and if it continues down this path, it will lose "control over much of its natural 
resources if it keeps borrowing and swapping natural resources for infrastructure money" 
(Shamiev, 2020, p. 83). Besides improper payment methods, the Tajik government has also 
provided Chinese firms that invest in the domestic economy with tax benefits. Based on this 
exchange, it appears China is relying on its own investment to extract more profits hindering 
long-term growth for Tajikistan.  
Another way Tajikistan is contributing to its own exploitation is that investments are 
being poured into "white elephant ventures" like constructing expensive parliament buildings 
and museums that divert crucial financing away from infrastructure that benefits the public 
(Reynolds, 2018). Officials are utilizing Chinese funds to create the illusion of development for 
the outside world and the people of Tajikistan. By producing an image of beauty and luxury, the 
government has forgotten to address the more crucial needs of Tajikistan. The nation is falling 
prey to debt-trap diplomacy, and the officials who run the country are facilitating this 
exploitation with useless infrastructure projects.  
Although China plays an integral part in the execution and maintenance of the various 
infrastructure projects, Tajikistan needs to evaluate the numerous other aspects of the deal to 
ensure the best outcome. To fully reap the benefits that the BRI has to offer, Tajikistan can not 
only host the commercial corridors it must also exercise proper diplomacy with neighboring 
countries and those who have a role in the initiative. The initiative is interdependent and needs 
all countries to work in unison, or there might be no benefit. Without proper coordination and 
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cooperation, the agreement will be a meaningless investment (World Bank, 2020). In order to 
reap the benefits that the BRI has to offer, "each state must first defend itself at the economic 
level, act with full transparency with local citizens, and not commit to projects it cannot pay for, 
thereby risking its sovereignty" (Yellinek, 2020). Besides the needed diplomatic communication, 
border delays and tariff rates must also be addressed, establishing a new set of trade facilitation 
reforms. Infrastructure projects will be costly, and unless these roads and other structures are 
employed efficiently, there will be practically no welfare gains (World Bank, 2020).  
c. Benefits   
Xi Jinping stated that the BRI is a "golden opportunity" for nations to gain crucial 
investment and improve connectivity with participating economies (Yellinek, 2020). The United 
Nations agrees, claiming that the BRI is meant to be a mutually beneficial agreement as 
Tajikistan will experience increased living standards and foster economic development. At the 
same time, China will secure access to more foreign markets and diversify its supply chains 
(Reynolds, 2018). The World Bank has provided a similar assertion, estimating that the BRI 
could potentially improve economic integration and better quality roads would lower shipment 
time by 4%, causing an increase in Tajik exports by 4-8% and GDP by 5-31%. Based on these 
predictions, Tajikistan is expected to experience a much larger economic benefit than the 70 
other participating nations (World Bank, 2020). Additionally, proximity to the world's fastest-
growing economic power can prove to be advantageous to Central Asian economies, as they 
have an easier and faster route to Chinese goods. In Tajikistan's case, the expedited shipment 
time that will result from improved roads will cause a big difference as it will allow for a quicker 
exit of products from Tajikistan and a faster route for Chinese goods to enter the Tajik market.  
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Although China has been depicted as a neo-colonizer by many critics, there is evidence 
that some Chinese investment has generated the stated benefits. Foreign Direct Investment has 
increased from $80 million to more than $300 million, coming from Chinese state-owned 
enterprises and private companies investing immensely in the cities of Istiklol and Danghara. 
Chinese firms have effectively utilized the Free Economic Zones (FEZs) in Danghara and 
Istiklol and poured lots of money into constructing numerous infrastructure projects (World 
Bank, 2020). In Danghara, specifically, a Chinese oil production and refining company and a 
processing plant for packing dried fruits are in the midst of development (Embassy of the 
Republic of Tajikistan in the federal republic of Germany, 2020). Cotton, in addition to other 
products, makes up a large portion of Tajikistan's exports. Although these products are an 
enormous economic contributor, many farmers have relatively low yields because they lack the 
proper tools and equipment to boost production. Bad road conditions also make perishable items 
difficult to transport. Chinese companies like the Zhongtai group from Xinjiang, Jing Yin Yin 
Hai, and Huang Fan are utilizing contract farming with local farmers in the Khatlon region, 
providing them with fertilizer and other tools to improve the production of cotton, wheat, and 
various other product (World Bank, 2020). Although China's long-term version has not been 
fully revealed, it can be observed that they have allocated a decent amount of funding towards 
helping locals and improving rural infrastructure that will undoubtedly improve the standard of 




Based on the present data, the dynamic between Tajikistan and China is very complex 
and has various other agents that impact the overall outcome. Much of the research published has 
currently illustrated China as an economic parasite that has latched itself to developing nations 
like Tajikistan to extract profits. China has been represented as a source of funding that aspires to 
manipulate Tajik society through the illusion of financial assistance and slowly pushing 
Tajikistan into its realm of authority. Although assumptions about China's ambitions in Central 
Asia might be accurate, they are being facilitated by corrupt government officials in Tajikistan. 
Tajik leaders are openly accepting Chinese financing with the label that these funds will be used 
to improve domestic infrastructure while transferring large portions of these loans towards their 
own bank accounts. Their lack of integrity has jeopardized the whole nation's economy, as it has 
made various sectors dependent on or managed by China. Beijing has absorbed these 
developments in Tajikistan and has taken advantage of the country's unstable state and ample 
supply of resources. Although Tajikistan is close to being controlled by China economically, it 
still has some options due to its geographical location. Tajikistan is at the epicenter of many of 
China's economic initiatives; without proper cooperation, Beijing will yield no benefits on its 
investments in Central Asia. Tajikistan is already very dependent on China, but it still has some 
alternatives to make the relationship less extractive and more beneficial to Tajik society. As long 
as Tajikistan properly examines the financing and mechanics of upcoming projects and 
effectively utilizes its geography, the nation can initiate actual development in the region. 
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III. Italy Case Study 
1. Introduction 
Italy is a Western European country and one of the founding members of the EU and 
NATO. In contrast to Tajikistan, Italy is one of the most developed countries in the world and is 
also part of the G7. However, the nation has faced an economic crisis that started with the global 
financial crisis of 2008-09 and has needed external sources of finance to cope with the effects of 
the economic slowdown. Most of these funds were provided by the EU, making Italy more 
dependent on the Union. The BRI and China thus provided Italy with an alternate source of 
finance to boost its economy, which led to Rome joining the initiative in 2019. However, it has 
been just over two years since the MoU was signed, which is much more novel than Tajikistan. 
As a result, most of the deals have not been completed, especially since the COVID-19 pandemic 
slowed down international trade. Additionally, a government change in 2021, coupled with a 
high volume of lobbying from the US, UK, France, and Germany, has put the Italian stance on 
the BRI under pressure, leading to a reduction in the extent of ties as well as the cancellation of 
some of the projects. As a result, Italy’s position in the BRI is still very new, and, therefore, the 
analysis presented here is necessarily speculative. There is not much information about the 
impacts of the initiative yet, because not enough deals have been completed. This section thus 
aims to present the possible scenarios and their impacts on the Italian economy as well as the 




2. History of Italian International Relations 
Until 1943, Italy was an enemy for the US, UK, and France, with Mussolini’s fascist regime 
siding with Germany in World War II. After the collapse of the fascist government, Italy’s 
politics started inclining more towards the West, establishing a democracy in 1946. It then 
became a founding member of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, aimed at 
reducing conflicts in the region and avoiding wars, signaling Italy’s commitment to a democratic 
ideology and the western powers. However, given Italy’s strategic geographic location at the 
center of the Mediterranean sea and acts as a natural hub connecting mainland Europe, North 
Africa, and West Asia, it has historically been a bridge between the East and the West. Before 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, Italy pursued open dialogue and economic partnerships with 
both the United States and the Soviet Union (Bindi, 2019). After the collapse of the Berlin Wall 
in 1989, Italy found itself deprived of a role and attention in the global political sphere and has 
struggled to define itself ever since. Regardless, Italy has a sizable economic presence in central 
and eastern Europe, North Africa, and central Asia, partly because of its colonial history. Italy is 
also part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and is a G7 nation, which maintains 
diplomatic ties with China. 
Italy became the first country in the G7 and the largest country in terms of GDP in the 
EU to participate in the BRI. Its cooperation led to some diplomatic backlash from the United 
States as well as the EU. The US warned Italy against China's "infrastructure vanity project" or 
risk damaging its global reputation (Giuffrida, 2019). The start of trade between Italy and China 
dates back to 1866 when the Kingdom of Italy sent a delegation to China to secure a cure for a 
disease affecting Italy's silkworm population. However, changes in leadership and conflicts 
during the early to mid-1900s worsened Sino-Italian ties until 1969, when Italy officially 
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recognized the People's Republic of China with a declaration by the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
(Strangio, 2020). Since then, the two countries have had a dynamic relationship, influenced by 
the varying global political scenario. Recent years have seen an increase in Sino-Italian 
cooperation. Trade between the two countries has increased fivefold from 2001 to 2019, from 
$9.6 billion to $49.9 billion (Zeneli and Capriati, 2020). 
 
3. Why would Italy want to join the BRI? 
Italy and China could appear to be unlikely partners under the BRI for political and 
economic reasons. As a member of NATO, EU, and G7, Italy is an integral part of the US-
centred western alliance, and as a result, Italian support for the Chinese trade initiative seems 
questionable, especially at a time when US-China relations are rapidly worsening (Dossi, 2020). 
However, for the past quarter-century, Italy’s economy has been nearly stagnant (University of 
Maryland, 2021).  Since the global financial crisis of 2008, Italy’s GDP growth has been close to 
zero or negative, and the economy has been struggling. The COVID-19 crisis made it worse, 
with lower income from tourism coupled with the effects of the economic lockdown. This trend 
is also visible in Figure 7, which shows Italy’s GDP growth rate across the last 50 years 




Figure 7: GDP growth rate - Italy (1961-2019) 
 
Source: World Bank 
The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 has impacted Italy and deteriorated the economy 
after twenty years of political instability and economic decline (Di Quirico, 2010). The economy 
entered a recessionary period in the last quarter of 2018 and has been experiencing a decline in 
real GDP ever since2. The collapse of a motorway in Genoa in August 2018 also raised concerns 
about Italy’s infrastructure and its reliability. Investments made by China are structured 
primarily around infrastructure projects and would provide Italy with funding to combat these 
concerns. Italy also faces rising external debt, as shown in Figure 8. As of 2020, it has had the 
second-highest external debt to GDP ratio in the EU, only after Greece (Guarascio, 2020).  
  
 
2 Based on data from CEIC: https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/italy/real-gdp-growth  
42 
Figure 8: External Debt as a percentage of nominal GDP - Italy 
 
Source: Arcgis database (from World Bank) 
If Italy does not deal with its external debt promptly, it could fall into a crisis like Greece 
and risk being bailed out by the EU. Rome is still trying to implement policies like having a flat 
tax and providing fixed incomes for the poor, which will lead to it experiencing even higher 
levels of debt. Brussels has also warned Italy and asked it to justify its current policies to combat 
the fiscal deficit it faces (Smith-Meyer, 2019). On a macroeconomic level, Italy’s financial crisis 
coupled with the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic makes Italy, a very suitable candidate for 
the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. However, it is more than an international economic bailout. 
Italy and China have growing interests in central and eastern Europe, North Africa, and Central 
Asia, and the BRI could create the conditions for fruitful cooperation in other countries. In 
addition to that, heavy investments by Chinese companies in the port of Piraeus in Greece have 
shifted trade in the Mediterranean region, with Piraeus experiencing 15 percent of Mediterranean 
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traffic in 2015, up from just 2 percent in 2008. This incentivized Italian ports to try and attract 
investments as well. 
 In addition to that, increasing Sino-Italian ties could also provide Italian firms with raw 
materials and parts at low costs for producing higher-end goods in Italy. This includes luxury 
clothing, cars, and appliances. The trend is already visible in some sectors; for example, in 2018, 
16.86% of textile imports in Italy were from China, the highest of any other country, most of 
which were unfinished and then made into finished products in Italy (Harvard, n.d.). Since Italy 
is in the Eurozone, it cannot individually impose or reduce trade barriers on other countries. 
However, it can reduce or remove tariffs for particular goods, which would allow Italy to 
strategically reduce barriers for certain goods that would bolster production domestically. 
However, it is essential to note that Italy faces a trade deficit with China of approximately 22 
billion as of 2020. Hence, in navigating trade with China, Rome needs to ensure that the 
negotiations under the BRI also involve increasing exports to China. 
4. Why would China want to invest in Italy? 
Since Italy is part of the EU, Sino-Italian relations are significantly impacted and affect 
China-EU trade and political relations. Over the past few years, China has been clear about its 
objectives in the EU: (1) free access to the European Single Market; (2) a secure home for its 
investments and, in particular, a willing partner for China’s fast-growing acquisition of overseas 
assets; and (3) a meaningful diplomatic alternative to its increasingly fractious relationship with 
the US (Yu, 2018, p.12). As a result, Italy’s involvement in the BRI would most likely be 
negotiated to try and achieve these agendas. 
 As mentioned previously, Italy’s strategic location at the center of the Mediterranean sea 
allows it to act as an entry point to Europe while being connected to North Africa and Central 
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Asia. In addition to that, economic ties with Italy would open European markets to Chinese 
goods, especially if they have access to ports like Trieste and Genoa. Also, in alignment with 
“Made in China 2025”, an initiative launched by Beijing in 2015 that emphasizes upgrading 
Chinese industries to shift China from being a low-end to a high-end manufacturer of goods. The 
plan also asks Chinese firms to ramp up their efforts to invest abroad by becoming familiar with 
overseas markets (Kennedy, 2015). This reflects the investments made by Chinese firms in Italy, 
where they either buy stakes in Italian companies or form partnerships for projects. The “Made 
in China 2025” initiative targets several sectors like railway, ocean engineering, and aerospace 
equipment (Cyrill, 2018). Italian automobile and engineering sector firms are thus suitable 
candidates for trade partnerships that would provide the necessary parts and encourage high-end 
manufacturing in China. Additionally, in the short term, this could also be beneficial to low-end 
Chinese producers if trade with Italy increases. There are many Italian firms that specialize in 
making high-end products, including textiles and luxury cars. If Sino-Italian ties are strengthened 
as a result of the BRI, more intermediate goods can be imported to Italy from China at lower 
costs which could then be used in manufacturing high-end Italian products. Additionally, 
investing in Italian firms would mean that part of the profits also goes towards Chinese 
companies. In Anglo-American countries, Asia, and especially China, the label Made in Italy has 
immediate connotations of beauty and chic (Lees-Maffei and Fallan, 2014). According to the EU 
rules of origin, a set of laws that determine where a product is from, goods shall be deemed to 
originate in the country or territory where they underwent their last, substantial, economically 
justified processing or working (EU, n.d.). Hence, the products would still have a Made in Italy 
tag even if the intermediate goods originate in China. In comparison to the Made in China tag, 
products made in Italy are associated with high-end luxury goods and, as a result, would likely 
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generate more profits. Additionally, since Italy is part of the Eurozone, trade between Italy and 
other European markets is accessible and barrier-free. Hence, in the short run, increasing trade 
with Italy and investing in Italian companies will allow China to have access to a lot more 
markets globally without as many trade restrictions.  
 Chinese investments are not purely infrastructural, especially in Europe, where they 
invest in the stock market and make monetary transactions with central banks. In October 2013, 
the PBOC and the ECB signed a bilateral currency swap for 45 billion euros, the largest ever 
signed by Beijing outside of China. The UK also raised 3 billion yuan via offshore sovereign 
yuan bonds and proceeded to keep them in yuans instead of converting them to dollars. Financial 
transactions like this ensure that the renminbi becomes recognized more in the global currency 
market, boosts market confidence in Beijing’s reform commitment, and increases the chances of 
the renminbi being included in the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights (Casarini, p. 7, 2015). 
Investing in Italian banks along with the ECB under the BRI could work towards this goal and 
bolster the renminbi’s standing in the international market.  
5. Geopolitical impacts 
As mentioned previously, one of Beijing’s major goals in pursuing EU-China ties is 
developing a meaningful diplomatic alternative to its increasingly fractious relationship with the 
US. China and the EU signed a comprehensive strategic partnership almost 18 years back; 
however, given the constantly changing geopolitical landscape, the nature of these relations has 
been changing as well. It started the China-Central and Eastern Europe Trade and Investment 
Forum in 2011, within the 16+1 framework; named so because it includes 16 Central and Eastern 
European countries along with China. This framework contested the EU’s plans for a shared 
vision and a standard international policy and incited fears that China was engaging in a “divide 
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and rule” political scheme (Le Corre, 2017). While no evidence could support or deny the claim 
at the moment, the EU’s reluctance to engage in multilateral talk with China about the BRI as a 
bloc results in individual countries pursuing bilateral deals, like Greece and Italy. Western 
European powers like Germany and France have been skeptical of the initiative, and Italy’s pivot 
towards a pro-Chinese sentiment raised concerns in the US and other EU powers (Follain and 
Mathieson, 2018). 
 Geopolitically, the BRI has the potential to be beneficial to both China and Italy. Since 
Italy is a G7 nation, it would provide China with a solid western power as an ally, helping 
advance their geostrategic vision and counterbalance a strong US-centric power dynamic. As for 
Italy, a partnership with China can provide alternative alliances and allow for a diplomatic and 
economic ally to fall back on that is not the US or another Western power. On a large scale, the 
BRI has the potential to provide an alternative idea on how to organize the space of international 
politics, reconciling sovereignty and globalization through policy coordination (Gabusi, 2019), 
and Italy could be a centerpiece in this shifting global dynamic. 
 However, there is some skepticism about the geopolitical advantages of the initiative for 
Italy. Firstly, there has already been considerable backlash from Italy’s traditional allies like the 
US, France, and Germany as Italy adopted a pro-Chinese view and signed the MoU in 2019. 
Hence, increased economic or political relations with China could place Italy in the middle of a 
balance of power and possibly weaken its alliances on either side. This seems increasingly likely 
if the US-China trade war escalates. Another geostrategic concern would be conflicting views on 
matters like the South China Sea and the sovereignty of places like Hong Kong and Taiwan. The 
EU has raised concerns about Taiwan and Hong Kong regions, and Italy’s participation in the 
BRI could conflict with the shared stance on those issues. Not adhering to the “One-China” 
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policy could also lead to conflicts with China and, as a result, would be tricky to navigate for 
Italy. Additionally, anecdotal evidence from Greece suggests that Italy might not benefit entirely 
from the BRI. In 2017, a Greek veto prevented Brussels from criticizing Beijing at the United 
Nations human rights council (McLaughlin, 2018) and also resisted an EU commission proposal 
to establish a European agency screening foreign investment in the EU (Horowitz and Alderman, 
2017). While Italy has not used its diplomatic influence for any similar cause, evidence from 
Greece suggests that Rome might have to align some of its geostrategic visions with China’s 
plans for greater influence. This could prove costly, especially if the US or EU react adversely, a 
possibility not too unlikely given Italy’s role in the G7 and the increasing friction between the 
US and China. Italy’s involvement in the BRI could vastly alter the structure of the global 
political sphere. It could potentially be beneficial, but only if there is a significant multilateral 
dialogue on Italy’s part to ensure that it balances the interests of the East and the West.  
 
6. BRI Projects in Italy 
As stated above, the BRI has slowly become a term that encompasses most if not all of 
China’s transactions with other countries and investment in foreign companies or stock markets. 
Hence, investments made by China before signing an MoU with Italy also impact Italy’s current 
trade with China and the geopolitical aspect of the deals. In 2014-15, the People’s Bank of China 
(PBOC) invested more than 3.5 billion euros in Italy through its investment arm, the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), and gained stakes of about 2 percent in ten of 
Italy’s most prominent companies (Casarini, 2015). This made the PBOC the tenth largest 
investor in the Italian stock exchange. Additionally, SAFE and ChemChina acquired the Italian 
tire-maker Pirelli for $7.86 billion, while the Chinese firm Suning bought a 69% stake in the 
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Italian soccer team Inter Milan. Between 2008 and 2019, Chinese firms and SOE’s have invested 
more than 26 billion dollars in Italian companies and infrastructure projects in a variety of 
sectors3. However, most investments were made in the automobile and IT firms, a trend that 
could be reflected as Italy’s role in the BRI develops. 
Italy and China started bilateral talks in 2017 about joining the BRI before finally signing 
a Memorandum of Understanding of 23 March 2019. The MoU listed six areas to promote 
bilateral cooperation: policy dialogue; transport, logistics, and infrastructure; unimpeded trade 
and investment; financial cooperation; people-to-people connectivity and green development 
cooperation4. In addition to this, the two countries signed a total of 29 deals amounting to 
approximately $2.8 billion (BBC, 2019).  
These deals included allowing Italy's state lender, Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP), to sell 
"Panda" bonds worth $744.5, close to 5 billion renminbi. "Panda" bonds are renminbi-
denominated bonds sold by a non-Chinese issuer, the CDP in this case, within mainland China. 
They allow foreign companies, particularly those with subsidiaries in China, to tap into an 
investor base and find the capital they need at attractive rates (Simmons-Simmons, 2021). It also 
included a collaboration between the China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) 
and the port of Trieste; there were talks of similar deals with Genoa's port. The Italian metal 
company Danieli also signed a deal to build part of a steel plant in China that would then be 
transferred to Azerbaijan (Reuters, 2019).  
  
 
3 Based on the China Global Investment Tracker, Data compiled by The American Institute and the 
Heritage Foundation. 
4 Based on a document issued by the government of the Italian Republic and the government of the 
People’s Republic of China. 
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7. The influence of politics on Italy’s position in the BRI 
 When Italy signed the MoU with China, the prime minister was Giuseppe Conte, who 
was in power from June 2018 to February 2021. He is affiliated with the Five Star Movement 
(5SM), a political party that believes in populist and anti-establishment movements. However, it 
is important to note that the Five Star Movement is eurosceptic, lacking citizens' trust, interest, 
and involvement in Europe (Kirk, 2001). Joining the BRI would provide Italy with alternate 
funding sources and reduce their financial dependence on the European Central Bank (ECB) and 
the EU. Italy has been given financial support in the past, once in 2012 after the global recession 
and once in 2020 due to the pandemic by the European troika, composed of the EU, ECB, and 
the IMF. However, Italy and the EU still have fiscal disputes (Guarascio, 2019). Since the ECB 
controls interest rates in the Eurozone, the government does not have control of its monetary 
policy and, as a result, cannot use it to attract foreign investments. If Italy gains investments 
from China, it would be consistent with the 5SM's eurosceptic view since it makes Italy's 
economy less reliant on the ECB and EU. Conte's government from 2019 to 2021 was hence pro-
BRI and encouraged Sino-Italian trade. The deputy prime minister then, Luigi Di Maio, was also 
a major proponent of the BRI and trade with China.  
 However, in February 2021, Italy elected a new president, Mario Draghi, who ran 
independent of a political party but did not share the views of Conte. Draghi served as the 
president of the ECB from 2011 to 2019 and, as a result, was more of a europhile rather than a 
eurosceptic. In his first few months in power, Draghi has already expressed concerns about the 
Chinese communist regime and suggested that Italy was carefully reevaluating China's 
investments in the country. He also mentioned that the government would thoroughly evaluate 
the agreement made under the BRI back in March 2019 (Nation World News, 2021). Moreover, 
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Draghi's government used the "golden power"; a law introduced in 2012 that allowed the Italian 
government to limit or stop foreign direct investments or corporate transactions if they involved 
strategic assets (Mazza et al., 2021) in order to block some Chinese investments. In particular, 
Draghi barred the Italian telecommunications company Fastweb from acquiring 5G equipment 
from ZTE (Bechis and Lanzavecchia, 2021). While the Conte government also implemented a 
similar law in 2020 to halt a deal between Huawei and Fastweb (Lanzavecchia, 2020), the new 
prime minister has adopted a more sino-skeptical approach. The new government also prevented 
the Chinese company Shenzhen Investment Holdings Co. from buying a 70% stake in LPE, a 
firm that produces semiconductor equipment (Fonte, 2021). In addition to this, Italy is also 
facing pressure from the US and the EU to ensure that the geopolitical balance does not tilt 
China. The US has been lobbying against using 5G equipment from China by European 
companies, citing privacy and security concerns, which resulted in Italy blocking the trade deals 
(Amante, 2020). Moreover, the collaboration between the CCCC and the port of Trieste has also 
been annulled, handing the management of the port of Trieste to a German company HHLA 
(50.1 percent), Francesco Parisi S.p.A (about 23 percent) ICOP (22 percent) and Interporto di 
Bologna (Ghiretti, 2020). This came after the concern of increasing Chinese influence among 
people and pressure from the EU and the US to reduce the extent of Sino-Italian ties. 
 
8. The BRI in Italy - Analysis 
Summing it up, the BRI could provide Italy with multiple economic and geopolitical 
advantages if the initiative is navigated adeptly. It could provide Italy with a source of finance 
for infrastructure, allow Italian firms to garner resources for production at lower costs, and allow 
them to invest in China to widen their scope and customer pool. It is necessary to note the 
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differences in the nature of investments and trade agreements between Italy and China versus 
other EU countries’ roles in the BRI. In 2018, the ambassadors within the 16+1 framework (does 
not include Italy and Hungary did not sign on it) sent a letter to the European Commission 
criticizing Chinese investments and the BRI. The letter stated that the BRI is far from a win-win 
project and has granted the bulk of business opportunities to Chinese companies (Gabusi, 2019). 
Despite Xi Jinping stressing that the BRI is helpful to other countries and not just self-serving, 
there is not much information about which non-Chinese firms benefited from the initiative 
(Heide et al., 2018). However, the Italian case is different since there are some agreements in the 
MoU where Italian firms invest in China. This suggests that it is more likely that the BRI will be 
mutually beneficial for both the countries in Italy’s case compared to other EU countries and 
Tajikistan. Additionally, reduced dependence on the EU and the US economically and 
geopolitically might serve Italy’s interests and allow it more fiscal and diplomatic independence. 
It would also align with Italy’s historical foreign policy, where it has always retained some 
freedom of action in dealing with strategic competitors or enemies of the EU and NATO 
(Cristiani, 2019). While Italian policy has become more inclined towards Western powers in 
recent times, the BRI could re-establish a better balance. Maneuvering through relations with 
either side such that neither side retaliates would be difficult but would allow Italy several 
geopolitical and economic advantages. 
Economically, the BRI works mainly in Italy’s favor by providing it with finance for 
some infrastructure, along with higher foreign direct investment and a chance to expand Italian 
firms’ outreach internationally. The economic crisis and the need to be bailed out by the EU has 
shown that the Italian economy is heavily dependent on the ECB and having no control over its 
monetary policy worsens the same. One drawback could be that Italy already faces a deficit with 
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China, and the BRI could escalate that. However, being a somewhat developed nation, Italy has 
higher negotiating power in the agreements and could procure deals to increase Italian 
investments in China and reduce the deficit. 
On the other hand, Italy might face much geopolitical backlash, especially because it is a 
member of the EU, NATO, and G7. The US and EU have labeled China as a strategic (Tengjun, 
2021) and systemic rival, respectively, and have also condemned Italy in the past for aligning too 
closely with the BRI (Von Der Burchard, 2019). Hence, increased Italian involvement in the 
initiative or close Sino-Italian economic or political ties is likely to receive diplomatic retaliation 
from Washington and Brussels. This could also have economic impacts if the backlash is in the 
form of sanctions. 
However, it is important to note that since the election of Mario Draghi as the Italian 
prime minister, Italy’s ties with China have weakened. While the MoU is non-binding (Cristiani, 
2019), China could potentially retaliate with diplomatic or trade sanctions if Italy withdrew from 
the deal. Italian withdrawal is also likely, especially after the recently held 47th G7 summit 
concluded in the launch of the Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative that has been framed as 
an alternative, democratic infrastructure initiative to China’s BRI (Mardell, 2021). While there 
are still potholes in the way, and the B3W is only months old compared to the BRI, it indicates a 
shift in the Italian view on Chinese trade relations. This shift suggests that Italy is currently 
adopting a more Sino-sceptic standpoint, changing its position in the BRI. Hence, the effects of 
the BRI on Italy are still developing and could change with new governments or evolving 




IV. Differences Between Tajikistan and Italy’s BRI relationship 
China’s BRI could have similar intentions for all participating states, but the extent of 
China’s objective will vary by economic status. While the official statements provided by 
Beijing suggest that the BRI is multilaterally beneficial and promotes development in all 
participating countries, this paper argues that countries will interact with the BRI differently. The 
developing world will have a contrasting perspective from the developed countries. Tajikistan 
and Italy are meant to mirror both sides of the spectrum to illustrate how China’s initiative aligns 
with their stated ambitions. The paper aims to depict the economic implications of collaborating 
with China and demonstrate whether the relationship is extractive or mutually beneficial for 
Tajikistan and Italy. Although the primary factor is based on the development stage of each 
nation, numerous other elements influence economic standing, like political structure, 
partnerships, and the length of cooperation with China. 
As mentioned before, economic stability plays a large role in how the BRI will unfold in 
participating nations. Tajikistan is a developing country with a low GDP, a comparatively low 
Human Development Index (HDI), and a high trade deficit, coupled with low food and energy 
security5. On the other hand, Italy is part of the G7 and is considered to be one of the highest 
developed economies in the world, and has an HDI of 0.892 (UNDP, 2020). While Italy faces a 
trade deficit with China, it has an overall trade surplus with higher food and energy security. 
Tajikistan's exports are more raw materials and minerals, in comparison to Italy, which exports 
higher value-added goods. Due to their varying economic conditions and structures, their needs 
and interactions with China will differ. As a developing nation, Tajikistan requires funding 
 
5 Determined by the nature of goods imported by Tajikistan. There was a high amount of imports of food 
(close to 16% of total imports) and energy (close to 12% of total imports). Data from the Harvard Atlas of 
Economic Complexity, 2018. 
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primarily in the infrastructure sector; therefore, road and rail projects are emphasized. In 
contrast, Italy pursues fewer construction-based loans and seeks capital associated with firms and 
stocks. Tajikistan's needs from the BRI are more urgent as they entail projects necessary to 
improve the standard of life that the current infrastructure cannot meet. China can detect the 
extent of each nation's need and can utilize this intel to its advantage. Due to Tajikistan's lack of 
capital and other sources of financing, its demand for foreign investment is crucial; therefore, 
China has been quick to supply the nation with loans. Conveniently for Beijing, these funds have 
come with a price tag that exceeds the original repayment amount. Tajikistan's proximity and 
membership in the global south have also made it vulnerable to China's ambitions to externalize 
environmental harm. Although Chinese investments meet a large portion of Tajikistan's energy 
needs, Beijing has efficiently masked its exportation of environmentally harmful industries under 
the label of economic assistance. China's perception of Tajikistan as a developing nation 
incapable of fully repaying its loans has allowed Beijing to alter agreements that benefit China 
more. For Tajikistan, this seems very beneficial at face value. It must prioritize rapid economic 
growth, but this will present various environmental obstacles in the future that will hinder real 
advancement. Besides economic expansion, the nation will be left to deal with the consequences 
alone as the harm was done on Tajik soil. China realizes Tajikistan's economic condition forces 
them to have limited options; therefore, it is taking advantage and presenting Tajikistan with 
projects that seem attractive even though they might carry long-term implications that are 
currently overlooked. In the case of Italy, this type of exploitation is less likely to occur because 
the European nation has a resilient economy and that does not require the same level of 
assistance as Tajikistan. Hence, it is evident that both the countries are very different in terms of 
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their macroeconomic indicators, which heavily influence their relationship with China and other 
countries. 
 Tajikistan is a recently established republic with roots connecting to the Soviet Union, 
while Italy is western power associated with the European Union. Tajikistan's communist past 
has translated into a modern-day relationship with Russia. As a result, Tajikistan has not had 
strong diplomatic ties with members of the global north like the US and EU, which currently 
dictate a large part of global politics and the workings of several international organizations. 
Being a post-Soviet nation, Tajikistan has been associated mostly with the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) and the EAEU, further distancing it from the US and countries of the 
EU. On the other hand, Italy is one of the founding members of the EU and has had strong 
historical ties with the US and other European nations. The partnership that Tajikistan and Italy 
hold massively impacts how they perceive the BRI. While Russia contested Tajik participation in 
the BRI, Italy was being questioned by the US. As Russia possesses a smaller influence in the 
global political sphere than the US, Italy has more to lose in its relationship with the North 
American power than Tajikistan does with Russia. This impacts the extent and quantity of 
projects that will be signed with China, as there is a considerable opportunity cost tied to 
agreeing to work with Beijing for Italy. In Tajikistan's case, the opportunity cost does not 
outweigh the promises of the BRI because the nation believes that the benefits will outweigh the 
initial cost of losing assistance from their historical partners. 
 The governance of Tajikistan and Italy vary immensely as they both have undergone 
different histories. Tajikistan has been under the same leadership since 1994, i.e., for 27 years, 
establishing a stronghold in the country for the president and his family, giving them the power 
to heavily control and influence the politics and economy. On the other hand, Italy changes 
56 
prime ministers much more often, and the average term over the past 75 years has been 14 
months (The Local, 2021). The rapidly shifting political ideology and geopolitical inclinations 
allow for an evolving economy that avoids consistent policies. Tajikistan's president has had 
control of the nation for several decades and thoroughly understands how the economy operates, 
so he has been able to pass policies that cater to his interests. This mentality heavily impacts how 
loans are requested and accepted from global organizations. For instance, borrowing from the 
IMF or World Bank usually comes with conditionalities like agreeing to adjust the country's 
economic policies to overcome the problems that led it to seek financial aid in the first place 
(IMF, 2021). In comparison, Chinese lending follows an expedited process and has fewer 
economic guidelines attached. A long-term head of state like in Tajikistan would thus be 
attracted to appeal to Chinese credit as it allows for a larger window for corruption, whereas 
Italy's changing political situation results in changes in the foreign policy towards China and 
other countries. The corruption that has occurred in the Central Asian country has come at the 
expense of Tajik land. Tajikistan has resorted to paying China back with land and mining rights. 
Contrastingly, Italy has paid off any loans through traditional means. Italy has the necessary 
financial and political resources to remain economically stable and negotiate with others. 
Tajikistan's economy is sensitive, and the lack of a robust support system often leads the nations 
to accept foreign investment immediately without examining the long-term repercussions of 
specific contracts. Tajikistan fits the developing model adequately, as it prioritizes a vast flow of 
capital without thoroughly examining if repayment is feasible.  
 Length of relations also contributes to the BRI's outcome in each country as there might 
already be certain economic and political expectations in place. As mentioned before, because 
Tajikistan's relationship with China is older than Italy's ties with Beijing, the Central Asian 
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nation has already had numerous projects completed. Many projects were completed before the 
BRI went into full effect but are categorized under the BRI label. China has played a massive 
role in Tajikistan's foreign investment sphere since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and has 
served as a consistent source of funding towards various infrastructure projects. While Tajikistan 
has experienced a formal relationship with Beijing for almost three decades, Italy's ties with the 
Asian superpower are novel; therefore, it is still examining the technical aspects of the BRI. Italy 
has not had a long relationship with China to establish a solid economic relationship, so it is 
hesitant to finalize agreements under the BRI. There are discussions to fulfill various projects in 
Italy, but unlike Tajikistan, it has yet to be started. More extended economic ties often translate 
to a stronger interaction, yet the case of Tajikistan is different. Tajikistan's lack of capital and 
proper financial management has caused the nation to increasingly become more indebted to 
China. Ever since negotiations with Beijing began, Tajikistan has been increasingly growing 
dependent on China. Due to the lack of other reliable sources of investment, Tajikistan has often 
turned to China for funding, simultaneously entrapping itself in a cycle of debt. Italy's ties with 
China are relatively new and have yet to develop to the same stage as Tajikistan, and the 
European nation has numerous other sources of alliances. As a member of the EU, Italy has 
access to various economic advantages and sources of credit. Italy's political alliance with 
Western powers allow it to diversify its flow of capital without becoming dependent on one 
supplier. 
         Tajikistan and Italy's dynamic with China will differ immensely as they are in different 
spots on the development spectrum. Additionally, their historical ties with China, government 
leadership, and political ties will influence whether the BRI carries exploitative motives or seeks 
to create an equally fruitful relationship. China's motives only make up a portion of the BRI 
58 
results in these nations; how the state accepts and divides the capital will also influence the 
outcomes. Italy's economic and geopolitical position gives it more leverage than Tajikistan, 
allowing it to freely negotiate without pressure as it has fewer demands than Tajikistan and is not 
in a state of rampant poverty. Tajikistan has less negotiating power as it needs money to foster 
domestic development. Although it is not forced to undertake Chinese funds, it does not have 
great alternatives like its counterpart. Beijing might have similar intentions for both Tajikistan 
and Italy in their economic agenda, but the way these objectives are fulfilled vary. China has 
taken both nations' structures under consideration and has maneuvered differently to meet their 
goals. Tajikistan's desperate need for infrastructure money has allowed China to alter some parts 
of the deal and make it more extractive. On the other hand, Italy is very vigilant when 





 The BRI is one of the most extensive economic agreements headed by one source and 
holds the potential to alter the global political landscape drastically. China is at the forefront of 
these commercial projects and wants to feed its sizeable economic capacity. Therefore it is 
imperative to examine whether China's economic endeavors are deceitful and meant to take 
rather than give. Our study has found that the BRI has been more exploitative for the partner 
countries due to China's eagerness to provide any nation with capital without guaranteeing that 
these loans will be repaid. Although the Chinese government has a clear extractive agenda, the 
final outcome is based on how participating nations negotiate and utilize Chinese capital.  
 We found that the outcome of BRI is determined by several historical, political, and 
economic factors that spread blame along between China and collaborating nations. The BRI is a 
simple proposal with sophisticated elements that dictate whether these contracts are beneficial or 
extractive. The data we have collected has aligned with the conclusion that developing countries 
like Tajikistan are far from being the victims of this agreement. Officials in the country enforce 
the exploitative nature of the BRI by accepting excessive loans and producing the illusion of 
development when in reality,  large portions of investments make it to their personal bank 
accounts. In the case of Italy, the results are less transparent as many of the projects have yet to 
be signed or completed. As a result, it is more difficult to assess Italy's situation, yet this depicts 
that the developed world is more resilient when working with China. The countries that comprise 
the global north have more options and do not need to jump at the first sight of foreign direct 
investment. Italy, unlike Tajikistan's government, does not need lots of foreign capital to 
stimulate the economy. Italy has stable domestic commerce and can continue down this path 
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without Chinese interference. On the other hand, Tajikistan needs foreign capital to encourage 
the economy, but how extractive the funds are depends on the nation.  
 Based on these dissimilarities, countries will engage differently with the BRI. Italy and 
Tajikistan vary in numerous ways, economically, politically, and their historical ties to China; as 
a result, their individual cooperation with Beijing will differ. Projects and agreements will not 
yield similar outcomes worldwide and hence cannot be characterized under one conclusion. The 
dynamic and history play a significant role in how these agreements will unfold and several other 
factors that create further complexity. Chinese intentions seem extractive, but the actual outcome 
depends on Beijing and the participating nation. China could enter with venal motives, but how 
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